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THE COMMISSION AND THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
W. David Curtiss*
In his eloquent plea in 1921 for a Ministry of Justice, Judge Cardozo
spoke of
... the need of the detached observer, the skilful and impartial critic,
who will view the field in its entirety, and not, as judges view it, in isolated
sections, who will watch the rule in its working, and not, as judges watch
it, in its making, and who viewing and watching and classifying and com-
paring, will be ready, under the responsibility of office, with warning and
suggestion.'
Since its establishment in 1934 the New York Law Revision Commis-
sion has been ready on many occasions with "warning and suggestion"
for law reform in this state. In perhaps no single area of law has the
impact of the Commission's work been more keenly felt than in the
general field of real property. Over the course of this twenty year period
some sixty recommendations have been made for improvement in the
handling of real property problems. These recommendations may be
grouped roughly into the following general classifications: mortgages;
the recording acts; wills, trusts and future interests; and miscellaneous.
I. MORTGAGES
The Commission's first venture into the field of real property mort-
gages related to the liability of receivers in mortgage foreclosures for
passive negligence. This problem had come into sharp focus in 1934 in
Woman's Hospital v. Loubern Realty Corporation,' in which the Court
of Appeals denied the liability of a receiver in his official capacity
for passive negligence. A receiver of rents and profits appointed in an
action to foreclose a mortgage upon real property is an officer of the
court, and he cannot be sued in his official capacity in the absence of
authorization by the court appointing him. The Woman's Hospital case
involved an application by a tenant for leave to sue a receiver for injury
to her person and property caused by the collapse of the ceiling of her
apartment. The allegation against the receiver was of passive, not
active, negligence; he had failed to fix the defective ceiling. By the
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead p. 764, for biographical data. C. Addison Keeler,
Jr. of the third-year class of the Cornell Law School provided helpful assistance ih the
preparation of this article.
I Cardozo, "A Ministry of Justice," 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 119 (1921).
2 266 N.Y. 123, 194 N.E. 56 (1934).
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court order appointing him, the receiver was empowered to keep the
premises in repair. It was held, however, that leave to sue him should
be denied.
Neither in the petition for leave to sue nor in the complaint appears any
allegation that the receiver participated in any affirmative act of negli-
gence. The complaint is based wholly on his passivity.... Generally, a
receiver of rents and profits in a foreclosure suit has no power without
order of the court to lessen the funds in his hands by expenditures for
repairs (Wyckoff v. Scofield, 103 N.Y. 630), and an order which em-
powers him to keep buildings in repair is permissive only and not manda-
tory. (Ranney v. Peyser, 83 N.Y. 1, 5, 6.) Such authority as has been
conferred upon him as an agent of the court imposes no duty to act in
respect to making repairs.3
The Commission was critical of the rule established by the Woman's
Hospital decision on three grounds: (1) that it was "in conflict with legal
theory applied in analogous situations'"-the recognized liability for
passive negligence of a receiver of railroad properties, of a receiver in a
corporate dissolution proceeding, of a receiver appointed to preserve
property during an appeal; (2) that it was "undesirable in its social
consequences" in that it flew in the face of New York's established
policy of promoting the keeping of dwelling houses in a proper state of
repair; and (3) that it was "unjust," since the tenant, denied recovery
against the receiver, was still subject to the terms of his own lease.
The Commission, therefore, in 1936 proposed a bill designed to change
the rule exempting a receiver from liability for passive negligence. The
bill failed to pass that year, and the C6mmission thereupon renewed
its recommendation in 1937 and again in 1938. It was not until 1946,
however, that section 977-c of the Civil Practice Act was enacted, thus
bringing to fruition this initial effort in the field of mortgages.4
Section 977-c now provides:
Liability of receiver of rents and profits for injury. A receiver of rents
and profits appointed in an action to foreclose a mortgage upon real
property shall be liable, in his official capacity, for injury to person
or property hereafter sustained by reason of conditions on the premises,
in a case where an owner would have been liable. Nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed to enlarge the liability of the receiver in his
personal capacity.
One of the important tools of a property lawyer in this state is Article
15 of the Real Property Law which affords a procedure for the de-
3 Woman's Hospital v. Loubern Realty Corp., 266 N.Y. 123, 125-126, 194 N.E. 56, 57
(1934).
4 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 1-9 (1946); Leg. Doc. 65(F),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 57-63 (1938); Leg. Doc. No. 65(B), Report of Law Rev. Com.
27-33 (1937); and Leg. Doc. No. 65(j), Report of Law Rev. Com. 619-698 (1936).
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termination of claims to real property. On three separate occasions-
in 1943, 1948 and 1951, the Commission has acted to make Article 15
a more useful and effective instrument in accomplishing its purpose.
In 1943 the Commission successfully recommended a series of amend-
ments designed to broaden the scope of Article 15 and to enlarge the
class of claimants who might take advantage of its provisions. Prior to
that time an action under Article 15 could be brought only by a plaintiff
who had been in possession of land for one year, and whose interest was
in fee or for life or for a term of years not less than ten; an executor or
administrator could not maintain the action. So too, prior to 1943, an
Article 15 proceeding was limited in the type of adverse claims which
might be determined. For example, the validity of liens and incum-
brances of a value of less than two hundred and fifty dollars could not
be determined. The 1943 amendments eliminated all these and other
restrictions, thereby making Article 15 available to any person claiming
any estate or interest in real property to compel the determination of
any adverse claims, provided only that plaintiff's interest in the property
is of a duration of at least five years.5
In 1948 the Commission considered the problem of the status of an
outlawed mortgage. What rights, if any, remain in a mortgagee after
the statute of limitations has run on his claim? 6 Does an uncancelled
mortgage outlawed by the statute of limitations constitute a cloud on
title which renders the title to the property unmarketable? 7 These and
related questions, to which no completely satisfactory answers could be
given, pointed up the importance of establishing a procedure for the
cancellation and discharge of record of such incumbrances. Upon the
Commission's recommendation, this procedure was created by a new
subdivision 4 to section 500 of the Real Property Law, which became
effective March 4, 1948.8 The procedure is available regardless of
whether the mortgage indebtedness has or has not been paid; it is im-
material whether or not it is a purchase money mortgage that is involved.
The action cannot be maintained, however, against a mortgagee in
possession. The procedure provided for in this statute is made equally
applicable in the case of outlawed vendor's liens.
The lawyer who proposes to take advantage of this new procedure
5 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 233-326 (1943).
6 In House v. Carr, 185 N.Y. 453, 78 NE., 171 (1906), the court held that a mortgage
could be foreclosed by advertisement under a power of sale even though the running of the
statute of limitations had barred its foreclosure by judicial action.
7 See Ouvier v. Mahon, 117 App. Div. 749, 102 N.Y. Supp. 981 (2d Dep't 1907), holding
such a title to be marketable.
8 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(N), Report of Law Rev. Com. 575-599 (1948).
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to cancel and discharge of record an outlawed mortgage must keep in
mind two possible limitations on its use. In the first place, the procedure
is available only if the mortgagee's right of foreclosure has been barred
not only as to principal but as to interest as well. In Nelson v. Fantino9
the Appellate Division recognized this fact, saying:
That statute authorizes the maintenance of this action to secure a can-
cellation and discharge of record of a mortgage when it becomes unenforce-
able by reason of an applicable Statute of Limitations. The mortgage
here involved, insofar as concerns the principal thereof, became unenforce-
able, under section 47-a of the Civil Practice Act, on September 1, 1944.
It however may have continued to be available by way of foreclosure for
the enforcement of the payment of interest due thereon prior to September
1, 1944, in an action commenced within six years thereafter, i.e., not later
than September 1950.10
A mortgagor, faced with the prospect of waiting out the period for the
statute of limitations to run on the interest, might perhaps be tempted
to pay up the interest so as to take advantage of section 500(4). But
the possible danger involved in such action is clear.
Undoubtedly a payment into court, or a payment coupled with a disavowal
of any implied promise to revive the barred principal, would not raise
the principal from the limbo of the Statute of Limitations. But the
typical situation involves the debtor who makes an unguarded payment,
unaware of the consequences under the principles of acknowledgment.":
There is another possible limitation on section 500(4) to be kept in
mind. It involves the question of whether this is a substantive statute
and hence inapplicable to mortgages in existence prior to its effective
date of March 4, 1948, or whether it is procedural and thus retroactive
in its operation.
In Armstrong v. Germain2 Official Referee Lapham said: "This sec-
tion [500(4)] supplies a remedy where none existed, and therefore a
right to action. A careful reading convinces me that it is devoid of any
expression of legislative purpose that it be retroactive."' 13
The retroactive effect of this statute was likewise discussed in Con-
tinental Bank and Trust Co. v. Tanager Construction Corp.4 In this
9 277 App. Div. 1058, 100 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d Dep't 1950). See also Radish v. Shulman,
91 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1949) (not officially reported).
10 277 App. Div. 1058, 1059, 100 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (2d Dep't 1950).
11 Comment, "Separability of Post-Maturity Interest in New York," 36 Cornell L.Q.
107, 120 (1950).
12 98 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1949) (not officially reported).
3. Id. at 963.
14 193 Misc. 245, 84 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1948), afl'd, 276 App. Div. 988,
95 N.Y.S.2d 275 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd without opinion, 302 N.Y. 663, 98 NXE.2d 476
(1951).
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case the Special Term said: "Furthermore, the relief in said statute
[500(4)] provided for is unavailable in respect of a mortgage satisfied
prior to its enactment. We do not, therefore, reach the larger question
involving the retroactivity of this statute."' 5 The judgment of the Special
Term was affirmed in the Appellate Division and again in the Court of
Appeals. Dissenting in the Appellate Division, Judge Van Voorhis made
a thoughtful appraisal of this matter, saying, in part:
The question in this case is whether that amendment applies to the
cancellation of mortgages in existence when it became law. That, in turn,
depends upon whether this statute is substantive or procedural in nature.
Strict logic might reach the conclusion that it is substantive (and un-
constitutional also) since it aims at the destruction of a right of indebted-
ness. But such an indebtedness could not be collected by any legal remedy,
and, therefore, has ceased to be a substantive right.... A right without
a remedy is so shadowy and disembodied a legal concept, as not to be
property .... It is then clear that a debt which is barred no longer par-
takes of the nature of property, whether it has been paid or not, from
which it follows that a statute providing a remedy to expunge its shadow
from the record, is procedural. . . This salutary amendment, like most
of Article 15 of the Real Property Law, would lose much of its useful-
ness, if it were deemed to extend only to mortgages made after its enact-
ment.16
The important question of the retroactive effect of this statute does
not as yet seem to have been satisfactorily answered.
The Commission's 1948 recommendation resulting in section 500(4)
has increased the usefulness of Article 15 in a significant way. The same
thing can be said with respect to a 1951 recommendation which cul-
minated in sections 500-a, 506-a and 506-b of the Real Property Law,
effective September 1, 1951.17
The 1951 legislation pertains to defective mortgage foreclosures, and
was an outgrowth of cases like McDonald v. Daly." Here the plaintiff-
mortgagee in 1935 foreclosed on property owned by the defendant-
mortgagor. The defendant had been adjudicated incompetent and his
wife had been appointed as committee of his person and property. The
wife was made a party to the foreclosure proceedings in her representa-
tive capacity as committee. The defendant, however, was not made a
party to the action in his individual capacity. The plaintiff bought in
the property at the foreclosure sale and went into possession of the
premises. In 1946 the plaintiff discovered the defect in his title resulting
from the failure to make the incompetent a party defendant in his in-
15 Id. at 249, 84 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
16 276 App. Div. 988, 989-990, 95 N.Y.S.2d 275, 276-278 (1st Dep't 1950).
17 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(K), Report of Law Rev. Corn. 501-548 (1951).
18 190 Misc. 136, 71 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1947).
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dividual capacity in the original foreclosure action. The plaintiff, as
purchaser at, the foreclosure sale, became an assignee of the fore-
closed mortgage by operation of law. He could have cleared his title
by reforeclosing this mortgage against the defendant had such a re-
foreclosure, action not been barred by the six year statute of limitations
of section 47-a of the Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff therefore brought
an action for strict foreclosure pursuant to subdivision 2 of section 1082
of the Civil Practice Act to extinguish the defendant's interest. This
section provides that where a subordinate interest in mortgaged premises
survives a foreclosure action because its owner was not made a party to
the proceedings, such owner may be required to redeem within a pre-
scribed time or face the extinguishment of his interest. The court dis-
missed the plaintiff's complaint, however, on two grounds: (1) that strict
foreclosure is barred by the same six year period as foreclosure by
action and sale, and (2) that strict foreclosure is not available against
the owner of the fee. In McDonald v. Daly the defendant had counter-
claimed for ejectment on the theory that as to him the plaintiff was a
mere trespasser. The statute of limitations in such an action to recover
possession of real property is fifteen years.' 9 The defendant's counter-
claim was dismissed for the plaintiff had gone into possession as a
mortgagee under color of right and was thus protected in his possession
from ejectment.
There was an obvious need for a procedure by which a purchaser in
a defective foreclosure action could perfect his title despite the fact that
the statute of limitations had barred reforeclosure. One suggested solu-
tion was to toll the six year statute of limitations until discovery of the
facts constituting the defect in title. 0 The Commission, however, pro-
posed a more comprehensive remedy which was enacted as sections 500-a,
506-a and 506-b of the Real Property Law, effective September 1, 1951.
Under this legislation a purchaser at a void foreclosure sale may bring
an action to determine claims even though an action to reforeclose the
mortage would be barred by the statute of limitations. The action is
available against an owner of the mortgaged property as well as other
claimants. Where it appears in such an action that the defect in the
19 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 34. An action to redeem likewise available to an omitted party,
may also be maintained for a period of fifteen years in accordance with N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 46,
20 The Committee on State Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York favored this solution over that recommended by the Law Revision Commission, point-
ing out that: "This bill has the advantage of being an amendment of the C.P.A. where pro-
cedural matters belong." See Memorandum No. 15, p. 59 of the Association's 1951 Legis-
lative Bulletin.
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original foreclosure proceedings was not due to the plaintiff's fraud or
wilful neglect, the judgment may reforeclose the mortgage by action and
sale; where the defect was not due to the fraud or wilful neglect of the
plaintiff and the defendant was not actually prejudiced as a result, the
judgment may provide for strict foreclosure by fixing a time within
which the defendant must redeem or thereafter lose his interest. Under
either alternative the plaintiff is allowed the value of any improvements
to the property made subsequent to the original sale.
Presumably some day the New York courts will be called upon to
construe those provisions in the new legislation which permit strict fore-
closure provided "that the defect in the foreclosure proceedings was not
due to fraud or wilful neglect of the plaintiff and that the defendant...
was not actually prejudiced thereby." In Moulton v. Cornish2 and
Denton v. Ontario County Bank2 the Court of Appeals limited the use
of strict foreclosure pursuant to section 1082 (a) of the Civil Practice
Act to the case where the plaintiff bought at the foreclosure sale in good
faith without knowledge of the defendant's outstanding interest and
where the defendant knew of the sale and permitted the plaintiff to buy
without disclosing his own outstanding interest. It will be interesting to
see the influence, if any, of these decisions on comparable litigation
under the 1951 legislation.
Most law blank printers are no doubt familiar with section 258
of the Real Property Law which sets forth various short forms of deeds
and mortgages. Schedules M and N consist of the short form mortgage
and the integrated bond and mortgage, respectively. The use of any
of these forms is optional. The lawyer, however, cannot stop with
section 258 but must also include section 254 in his thinking because
this latter section establishes the construction which must be given to
the various clauses and covenants in the statutory short form mortgage.
In 1945 the Commission discovered in a number of instances that the
language of a particular provision in the short form mortgage was un-
clear or even misleading in the light of the construction required to be
given it. For example, under covenant 7 in the short form mortgage the
mortgagor agreed to furnish a statement of the amount due on the
mortgage. According to the mandatory construction given to covenant 7
by section 254, however, the mortgagor was required in addition to
certify whether there were any offsets or defenses existing against the
mortgage debt. The Commission therefore recommended, and success-
fully, that the language of this covenant in the statutory short form be
21 138 N.Y. 133, 33 N.E. 842 (1893).
22 150 N.Y. 126, 44 N.E. 781 (1896).
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amended to conform to the construction required to be given it.
Four other comparable discrepancies were also corrected.23
Any accounting of the Commission's contributions to the real property
mortgage law of this state must of necessity recognize its role in the
enactment in 1948 of a new section 321 of the Real Property Law re-
lating to the recording of mortgage discharges.24 Up to that time there
had been an unfortunate lack of uniformity among recording officers
throughout the state with respect to discharging mortgages of record in
cases where ownership of the mortgage was divided. For example, where
an assignment of a mortgage indicated that it had been assigned as
collateral security, County A's practice might have been to discharge the
mortgage of record only if the certificate of discharge were signed both
by the assignor and the assignee; County B, on the other hand, might
have required the assignee's signature alone. By the same token, the two
counties might have pursued different recordation policies in the case of
plural mortgagees or assignees-one requiring the discharge to be signed
by only one of the co-owners, the other county insisting on the signatures
of all the co-owners. It was little wonder that the county clerks had
varied recording practices. Section 321 as it then read required a record-
ing officer to discharge a mortgage of record upon receipt of a certificate
"signed by the mortgagee, his personal representative or assignee"--
hardly an adequate guide in cases of divided ownership. In any event,
remedial legislation was called for and was forthcoming in the form of
a new section 321 which now provides a uniform rule for the guidance
of recording officers in these cases.
The Commission's most recent action in the field of real property
mortgages came in 1953 and related to the assumption of a mortgage in-
debtedness by a grantee of the mortgaged premises.25 In 1938 section
1083-c was added to the Civil Practice Act and it required that the as-
sumption of a mortgage debt be in writing. It was designed to protect
the grantee of mortgaged premises who might otherwise incur liability
for a mortgage indebtedness by the mere acceptance of a deed contain-
ing an assumption clause or even by a parol assumption. It became evi-
dent, however, the section 1083-c by its express terms did not apply to
two substantial groups of grantees: (1) those who bought property sub-
23 See Leg. Doc. No. 69(H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 239-299 (1945).
24 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(A), Report of Law Rev. Corn. 23-30 (1951); Leg. Doc. No.
65(P), Report of Law Rev. Com. 507-512 (1950); Leg. Doc. No. 65(N), Report of Law
Rev. Corn. 817-839 (1949); Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 65-122
(1948); Leg. Doc. No. 65(N), Report of Law Rev. Com. 789-855 (1946).
25 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (P) (1953) [At printing, Report of Law Rev. Com. (1953) un-
bound. No page citations available -Ed.]
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ject to a mortgage executed before April 6, 1938, the effective date of the
statute, and (2) those who bought property subject to a mortgage debt
which did not originate simultaneously with and was not secured solely
by the mortgage. These persons could still become bound under the old
rule permitting unwritten assumptions. There seemed to be no sound
reason why these particular grantees should be denied the protection
offered by section 1083-c; indeed, there was every reason to bring them
within its terms, and this was accomplished by an amendment to the
section enacted upon the Commission's recommendation and effective
September 1, 1953.
An upstate practitioner had written the Commission about section
1083-c (before its amendment in 1953) as follows:
First: The section became effective April 6, 1938. If the conveyance
takes place after that date, does the section mean that the mortgage must
have been executed after that date, or does the section relate to mortgages
executed before or after that date, if executed prior to the conveyance?
The language seems capable of either construction.
Second: Leaving purchase money mortgages out of consideration, and
in case of a mortgage executed many years ago, and which has been re-
peatedly assigned, how is anyone supposed to know, or find out, whether
"the indebtedness originated simultaneously with . . . such mortgage"?
Here, as in so many cases, the Commission's initial interest in the
problem stemmed from a comment-or a question-from a member
of the Bar. The practicing lawyers throughout the state have been a
rich source of helpful ideas and suggestions upon which the Commission
has drawn heavily these past twenty years.
II. THE RECORDING ACTS
The New York recording acts are designed to prevent fraud and
facilitate the conveyancing of real property. These laws are able to
accomplish their purposes far more effectively today than was the case
in 1940, because in that interval the Legislature has provided for the
recording of three major types of instruments affecting real property:
(1) land contracts, (2) assignments of rents, and (3) judgments, final
orders or decrees affecting the title to or possession, use or enjoyment of
real property. In each instance the impetus came from the Law Revision
Commission.
The legislative action concerning land contracts occurred in 1940 at
a time when these instruments were outside the protection of the record-
ing acts. Under the New York statutes, the recording of a deed or
mortgage constituted constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and
incumbrancers, and the holder who thus recorded his interest was thereby
1955]
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protected against their claims. If, however, he failed to record, his
interest was void as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser or in-
cumbrancer who did record. Although section 294 of the Real Property
Law specifically authorized the recording of an executory contract for
the sale, purchase or exchange of real property, it was well established
that such a recording did not constitute notice to subsequent purchasers
or incumbrancers so as to protect the contract vendee. The Court of
Appeals had said in Washburn v. Burnham:2"
The instrument in question was a mere contract for the sale of lands....
The record of it in no way added to its force or validity. The only effect
of the statutory provisions for the recording of contracts for the sale of
lands is to preserve evidence and facilitate proof thereof, and th record is
not constructive notice to subsequent purchasers or incumbrancers .... 27
By amendments to relevant sections of the Real Property Law, execu-
tory land contracts were in 1948 brought within the protection of the
recording acts.28 An unrecorded conveyance is now void as against a
subsequent bona fide contract vendee who first records his contract. 29
An unrecorded executory land contract is void against a subse-
quent bona fide purchaser or contract vendee whose conveyance
or contract is first recorded; a memorandum of the contract may be
recorded in lieu of the contract itself; the recording is effective up to
the time fixed by the. contract for the conveyance of title, with provision
for an extension agreement.30
In 1952 in Matter of Downtown Athletic Club v. State Tax Commis-
sion,3" the Third Department of the Appellate Division was faced with
an interesting tax question related to the recording of land contracts.
Under a contract which gave the purchaser the right to possession of
the property, the vendee, already in possession, continued its occupation
of the premises. This contract was not recorded. The vendee assigned
its interest in the contract, and the conditions of the contract having been
met, a deed was delivered to the assignee. The recording officer of New
York County refused to record this deed without payment of the mort-
gage recording tax, and the State Tax Commission confirmed this de-
cision.
26 63 N.Y. 132 (1875).
27 Id. at 134-135.
28 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 157-166 (1940); Leg. Doc. No.
65(D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 37-45 (1938); Leg. Doc. No. 65(N), Report of Law Rev.
Com. 387-398 (1937).
29 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 291.
30 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 294.
31 280 App. Div. 363, 113 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dep't 1952).
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Under section 250 of the Tax Law, executory contracts for the sale
of real property under which the vendee has or is entitled to possession
are deemed to be mortgages for the purpose of the recording tax im-
posed on mortgages by section 253 of the same law.
The Appellate Division annulled the Tax Commission's determina-
tion, saying, in part:
The Tax Commission, however, took the different view that the tax was
imposed on the recording of the contract and that the deed should not be
recorded until the contract also bad been recorded and the tax paid....
But at the time the deed was offered for recording, the contract of
sale was no longer an executory contract. It had been fully executed as
far as it related to the transfer of real property, by the giving and taking
of the deed. There was then no statutory or other legal requirement on
the vendee to record the contract, nor was thefe any such obligation
during the executory period of the contract. It was only if the benefit
of the protection of the recording act, whatever it might be, was sought by
the vendee that recording was necessary....
The crucial point in this proceeding, therefore, is whether the Tax Com-
mission was right in imposing the recording of the contract of sale and the
payment of the tax thereon as a condition for the recording of the deed of
conveyance. The deed is absolute on its face and makes no reference to the
contract of sale or to any indebtedness. It would require very explicit
language in a tax statute to sustain such a requirement, and we do not
find that kind of language.8 2
In the statutory note to section 294-a of the Real Property Law,
specific mention is made of Conley v. Fine33 and Rolandelli v. Stanton.34
These cases did effectively point up the need for legislative action con-
cerning the assignment of future rents.
In Conley v. Fine, the Appellate Division granted the plaintiff-assignee
of future rents a priority over the defendant, a mortgagee to whom the
rents had been subsequently assigned, saying:
The circumstance that the assignment of the rents to plaintiff was not
recorded . . . is of no consequence because an assignment of rents was
not a conveyance of, nor an incumbrance upon real property and was,
therefore, not within the Recording Act.35
And in the Rolandelli case, in protecting an assignee of rents against
subsequent grantees of the property, the court pointed out:
While the assignment of rents had been recorded, thus giving ground
for argument that the defendants Schreiber and Costa had notice of same,
32 Id. at 366, 113 N.Y.S.2d at 487-488.
33 181 App. Div. 675, 169 N.Y. Supp. 162 (1st Dep't 1918).
34 129 Misc. 270, 220 N.Y. Supp. 502 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1927).
35 Conley v. Fine, 181 App. Div. 675, 678, 169 N.Y. Supp. 162, 164 (1st Dep't 1918).
36 Rolandelli v. Stanton, 129 Misc. 270, 273, 220 N.Y. Supp. 502, 504-505 (N.Y. Munic.
Ct. 1927).
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such recordation of the assignment was not necessary, as the defendants
Schreiber and Costa were bound by the assignment, irrespective of notice.36
Under pre-1944 New York law, then, assignments of future rent under
existing leases were outside the scope of the recording acts. This meant
possible-and substantial-injustice: to a bona fide purchaser of prop-
erty who, in taking subject to a prior unrecorded rent assignment, might
thereby lose future rents representing a significant part of the value of
the land; to an assignee of future rents unable by recording to protect
his interest against prior unrecorded deeds, executory agreements to
purchase and assignments of the same rent. In 1944, therefore, upon
the Commission's recommendation, assignments of rent to accrue under
existing leases were brought within the recording statutes. This was
accomplished by the enactment of a new section 294-a of the Real Prop-
erty Law, together with amendment to sections 291 and 294.11
1949 saw the enactment of section 297-b of the Real Property Law
providing for the first time in this state for the recording of judgments,
final orders and decrees affecting the title to real property. 38 The statute
authorizes, but does not make mandatory, the recording of these docu-
ments. This statute had the approval of the organized Bar as a method
of facilitating the examination of titles. Although favoring the legisla-
tion in general, the Committee on State Legislation of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York did raise two questions that are
worth noting. The first related to that part of section 297-b which pro-
vides: "For purposes of recording and indexing such judgment, order or
decree, the prevailing party or parties named therein shall be deemed
grantees and all other persons named therein shall be deemed grantors."
The Bar Association commented:
The bill has also been criticized on the ground that it puts the burden
of determining who was the successful party on the recording officer and
may lead to confusion in cases where neither party was completely success-
ful or both were partially successful. This objection is not unsubstantial,
but does not in itself seem to justify a disapproval of the measure.39
Experience under section 297-b does not seem to have substantiated
this objection.
In the second place, the Association of the Bar questioned the per-
missive character of the new legislation:
37 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(1), Report of Law Rev. Com. 221-289 (1944). In 1948 N.Y.
Real Prop. Law § 294-a was amended to make clear that it included assignments of rent to
accrue from existing leases regardless of whether the lessee's occupancy had begun at the
date of the assignment. See Leg. Doc. No. 65(J), Report of Law Rev. Com. 359-379 (1948).
38 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 365-414 (1949).
39 See the 1949 Report of the Committee on State Legislation of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Memorandum No. 73, p. 224.
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The remedy would seem to be a mandatory recording statute providing
that the judgment shall be void as against a bona fide purchaser for value
unless recorded in the proper recording office in the county in which the
property is located. 4 o
To this writer the reasons which caused the Commission to reject a
compulsory recording act seem sound: (1) that mandatory recording
would call into question-and perhaps unconstitutionally---"long-stand-
ing principles of res judicata that matters litigated to judgment shall be
deemed finally and conclusively settled as between the parties and those
in privity with them," (2) that "it would be exceedingly difficult to
apply such a statute to in rem proceedings binding unidentified parties,"
and (3) that the result of compulsory recording would be "to flood the
record books with immaterial items and to impede the work of title
searchers.'
The new enactments with respect to the recording of land contracts,
rent assignments, and judgments affecting real property do not exhaust
the Commission's efforts in this field. In addition there has been new
legislation relative to the filing of federal tax liens,'as well as concern-
ing the preservation of existing judgment liens where a judgment dis-
charged in bankruptcy is cancelled of record pursuant to court order.43
Today this state's recordation policies and procedures are more useful
and effective as a result of the Commission's work during the past twenty
years.
III. WILLs, TRUSTS AND FUTURE INTERESTS
It should be recognized at the outset that many of the Commission's
projects which might be classified under this heading are by no means
limited to real property, but often involve personal property as much
if not more. The classification of the material into separate sections
labelled "Wills," "Accumulations," "Trusts" and "Trusts and the Rule
Against Perpetuities" is concededly artificial and unrealistic in view
of the overlapping and interrelationship among these topics. The classi-
fication is useful, however, if it is kept in mind that its purpose is
merely to aid in the orderly presentation of the material.
A. Wills
The Commission's initial study addressed specifically to the subject
of wills illustrates its policy of recommending against statutory revision
40 Id. at 223.
41 Leg. Doc. No. 65(E) at 5-6, Report of Law Rev. Com. 369-370 (1949).
42 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 183-219 (1944).
43 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(A) (1953).
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where analysis of existing law indicates that new legislation is unneces-
sary and would be unwise. The study considered the doctrine of in-
corporation by reference as applied to wills."
The doctrine of incorporation by reference has been phrased as
follows:
If a will, executed and witnessed as required by statute, incorporates in
itself by reference any document or paper not so executed and witnessed,
whether the paper referred to be in the form of a will or codicil, or of a
deed or indenture, or of a mere list or memorandum, the paper so referred
to, if it was in existence at the time of the execution of the will, and is
identified by clear and satisfactory proof as the paper referred to therein,
takes effect as part of the will, and should be admitted to probate as such.45
In a number of cases prior to 1881, the New York courts gave effect to
this rule,46 but after that date a series of decisions, while purporting to
distinguish the earlier cases, indicated that the rule had fallen from
judicial favor and was greatly restricted in its applicability.47  The
Commission's study showed that incorporation by reference is allowable
where a codicil refers to a validly executed will of the testator pre-
viously revoked; or where a will refers to the dispositive clauses of the
validly executed will of another person, which will is in existence at the
time of the reference; or where the reference is to the testator's own
existing, identified, and irrevocable deed of trust.4" It is not allowable
where the reference is to a purported prior will ineffective for defective
execution, or to an instrument which has no independent legal sig-
nificance, as, for example, a letter of instructions. The effectiveness
of other types of references, not within these classes, remains uncertain.49
The consultant to the Commission expressed the view that neither com-
plete abolition nor complete revival of the doctrine would be wise, and
that the better course would be to leave the problem to a case-by-case
development in the courts.5 ° The Commission agreed that legislative
action would be inadvisable. 1
44 Leg. Doc. No. 60(G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 34s-448 (1935).
45 Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass. 91, 93 (1881).
46 Brown v. Clark, 77 N.Y. 369 (1879) (prior will revoked by marriage); Tonnele v.
Hall, 4 N.Y. 140 (1850) (reference to a filed map); Jackson dem. Herrick v. Babcock, 12
Johns. R. 388 (1815) (antenuptial agreement).
47 See, e.g., Matter of Whitney, 153 N.Y. 259, 247 N.E. 272 (1897); Matter of O'Neil,
91 N.Y. 516 (1883).
48 As to incorporation by reference of a revocable and amendable trust, see President and
Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't
1940), noted in 26 Cornell L.Q. 172 (1940).
49 See Leg. Doc. No. 60(G) at 103-104, Report of Law Rev. Com. 447-448 (1935).
60 Id. at 104, Report of Law Rev. Com. 448 (1935).
51 Id. at 5-6, Report of Law Rev. Com. 349-350 (1935), wherein the Commission states:
The Commission has'caused a study to be made on the subject of the Doctrine of In-
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A later study illustrates the responsiveness of the Commission to state-
ments contained in judicial opinions pointing out inadequacies in the
law. In a 1931 case52 involving a bequest to the unincorporated "Brook-
lyn Society for Parks and Playgrounds for Children," the surrogate
was confronted by the common law rule that an unincorporated associa-
tion cannot acquire ownership to property53 unless specifically authorized
by statute.5 Under the law as it then was, a devise or bequest to a non-
profit unincorporated association, other than one specifically authorized
to take property by statute, could be effectuated only by one of several
devices employed by the courts to save such attempted gifts. These in-
cluding finding that the donee was misnamed, and substituting as donee
an incorporated organization with a similar name,55 or making the
incorporated parent the donee, rather than the unincorporated subsidiary
named in the will,r 6 or ascribing a general religious, educational, chari-
table or benevolent character to the gift, which might then be received
and administered by the testamentary trustee or by a judicially ap-
pointed trustee.57 In the opinion in the 1931 case, after finding a general
charitable purpose in order to effectuate the intent of the testatrix, the
court deplored the fact "that courts should be compelled to resort to
such substantial circumvention of outworn rules of law," but recognized
that "[t] he remedy ... is beyond the power of a court of first impres-
sion and lies with the Court of Appeals or the Legislature."55
Not only were such devices used to carry out the terms of a will un-
necessarily cumbersome, but in many instances they failed to allow for
perfectly reasonable gifts to non-charitable associations such as labor
corporation by Reference as Applied to Wills, which it herewith submits. It believes
this study to be a valuable contribution on the subject and is in agreement with the
conclusion therein reached that no change should be made in the present law.
52 Matter of Patterson, 139 Misc. 872, 249 N.Y. Supp. 441 (Surr. Ct. Kings County
1931).
03 See, e.g., Downing v. Marshall, 23 N.Y. 366 (1861); Owens v. Missionary Society, 14
N.Y. 380 (1856).
54 N.Y. Benevolent Orders Law § 3-a; N.Y. Agriculture & Markets Law § 290; N.Y.
Real Prop. Law § 113(1); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 12(1).
55 In re Stymus' Will, 64 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1946) (not officially
reported); Matter of Howland, 120 Misc. 224, 198 N.Y. Supp. 894 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County
1923).
56 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(1) and cases cited 49-52, Report of Law Rev. Com. 325-499,
cases cited at 373-376 (1951).
57 Matter of Howells, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N.Y. Supp. 598 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1932),
modified, 146 Misc. 169, 261 N.Y. Supp. 859 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1933); Matter of
Winburn, 130 Misc. 5, 247 N.Y. Supp. 584 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1931); N.Y.
Real Prop. Law § 113(1); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 12(1).
58 Matter of Patterson, 139 Misc. 872, 876, 249 N.Y. Supp. 441, 445 (Surr. Ct. Kings
County 1931).
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unions, political parties and the like. On the other hand, strong policy
considerations favored the preservation of the requirement that as-
sociations subject themselves to the statutory regulation incident to in-
corporation.59 A workable solution would appear to be to postpone vest-
ing of the devise or bequest pending incorporation by the donee, should
the latter elect to take such a step. Under the existing law, however,
the gift would have to be construed as contingent upon future in-
corporation60 within the permissible period of postponement of vesting,
i.e., two lives in being at the death of the testator.61  Thus a direct
testamentary gift to the association, without an intervening period of
sufficient duration to permit incorporation, would fail. The Commission
therefore recommended adoption of the present section 47-e of the
Decedent Estate Law which allows a minimum period in gross of one
year from the probate of the will in which the donee may incorporate,
the property to be administered in trust for the intervening period.62
Enacted in 1952, the section provides an additional method for effectuat-
ing the intention of testators to benefit unincorporated associations.63
Upon the recommendation of the Commission, the Legislature in
1953 amended section 113 of the Real Property Law and section 12 of
the Personal Property Law so as to extend the cy pres power of the
surrogate's court and the supreme court to include absolute gifts for
charitable purposes to donees which have ceased to exist or never ex-
isted. 4 Prior to these amendments, the cy pres power of the court
59 Leg. Doc. No. 65(j) at 10, Report of Law Rev. Com. 334 (1951):
The policy of the present law denying power to hold property to unincorporated asso-
ciations generally is substantial. The corporate form furnishes certainty to members of
the public dealing with the organization as to the identity and power of its officers to
deal with property. It provides, moreover, a mode of internal management of the
affairs of the organization which is regulated by statute, and subject to supervision
by the courts under established doctrine, so as to afford protection to the interest of
the members ....
60 Shipman v. Rollins, 98 N.Y. 311 (1885); Philson v. Moore, 23 Hun 152 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Gen. T. 2d Dep't 1880).
61 N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 42, 50; see Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N.Y. 254 (1871) (period
to obtain act of incorporation measured by two year term in gross provided two designated
persons should live that long).
62 Enacted in Laws 1952, c. 832 (see Leg. Doc. No. 65(F), Report of Law Rev. Com.
147-161 (1952)). An earlier recommended statute (1951 Sen. Int. No. 125, Pr. Nos. 125,
2940; Assembly Int. No. 156, Pr. Nos. 156, 3415; see Leg. Doc. No. 65(J), Report of Law
Rev. Com. 325-499 (1951)) was disapproved by the Governor on the ground that the pro-
posed statute did not make it sufficiently clear that the courts retained authority to validate
gifts to unincorporated associations by exercise of the cy pres power or other rules of con-
struction referred to above.
63 See In re Smith's Will, 121 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Surt. Ct. Monroe County 1953) (not
officially reported), indicating the variety of devices available to the court to effectuate the
primary purpose of the devise.
64 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(S) (1953).
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extended to absolute gifts to existing corporations for charitable pur-
poses, whether such purpose was manifested by the terms of the gift
or by the purpose of the donee's incorporation as expressed in its
charter.65 Thus, if the donee corporation should dissolve or cease to
carry on the purposes for which the property was given, the court
would have jurisdiction to dispose of the subject matter of the bequest
or devise in such a way as to accomplish the purpose of the testamentary
instrument. But where an absolute gift for a charitable purpose were
made to a donee which had ceased to exist, or which had never existed,
the gift would fail. 6 On the other hand, a gift in trust for charitable
purposes could be administered cy pres by the testamentary trustee
or the court if the donee were unable to take6 7 The reason for this
difference in treatment between a gift in trust and an absolute gift to
a charitable corporation was largely historical,6 and had been partially
abolished by specific statutory enactments under which the successors
to the property of religious and membership corporations benefit from
later bequests to the former corporation.69 It was against this back-
ground that the Real and Personal Property Laws were amended to ex-
tend the cy pres doctrine to this class of cases."o
In these, as in other testamentary projects, the tenor of the Commis-
sion's approach has been one of moderation, an effort to facilitate the
carrying out of reasonable testamentary dispositions without sacrificing
other valued ends, such as certainty in the designation of beneficiaries,
and the public regulation of donees of charitable gifts.
B. Accumulations
Under New York statutory law, the accumulation of trust income
is allowed only "for the benefit" of a designated minor and may not
continue for a period exceeding his minority.7 If a settlor creates a
65 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 113; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 12; Sherman v. Richmond Hose
Co., 230 N.Y. 462, 130 N.E. 613 (1921).
66 See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, 225 N.Y. 329, 122 N.E. 213 (1919).
67 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Guild for the Jewish Blind, 252 App. Div. 493, 299 N.Y.
Supp. 911 (1st Dep't 1937); Kernochan v. Farmers Loan & T. Co., 187 App. Div. 668, 175
N.Y. Supp. 831 (1st Dep't 1919). If a trust may be implied or is expressed, there is no
lapse, but where an absolute gift is bequeathed to a non-existent donee cy pres cannot save
it. Matter of Walker, 185 Misc. 1046, 53 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1944) (un-
der the authority of Wright v. Wright, supra).
68 Leg. Doc. No. 65(S) at 17-19 (1953).
69 N.Y. Membership Corp. Law §§ 51, 56(5); N.Y. Religious Corp. Law § 209.
70 The former rule still obtains in cases where the testator died before September 1, 1953,
and hence remains of considerable importance. See In re Alsop's Will, 127 N.Y.S.2d 551
(Surr. Ct. Kings County 1953) (not officially reported).
71 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 61; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 16.
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gift over of accumulated income in the event his beneficiary dies during
his minority, is such a provision "for the benefit" of the minor' and is
the gift over valid? Prior to 1945 the answer to this question was not
completely clear. There would seem to be no sound objection to such
a gift over, for the death of the infant precludes the possibility of his
receiving any personal benefit from the accumulations. A gift over of
the corpus would be good. 7 Although the decisions generally sustained
the validity of a gift over of accumulated income if the minor died under
twenty-one, 7  the language in some cases, emphasizing that the ac-
cumulation must be for the exclusive benefit of the minor, 4 made clarify-
ing legislation desirable. In 1945, therefore, new sections 61-a of the
Real Property Law and 16-a of the Personal Property Law were en-
acted at the Commission's suggestion, thereby removing any doubt as
to the validity of a gift over in such circumstances.75
C. Trusts
The reluctance of the Commission to recommend sweeping changes in
the law in order to achieve limited although important objectives is
typified by its recommendations resulting in the 1951 amendments to
section 118 of the Real Property Law and section 23 of the Personal
Property Law.76 Before the amendments, these sections provided for
the revocation of trusts, where no power to revoke had been reserved
by the creator of the trust, with the written consent of "all the persons
beneficially interested" therein.7  In Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 7
the grantor attempted to revoke a trust which directed the trustee to
pay the principal of the trust, on the death of the grantor, to those
persons who would be distributees if the grantor had died intestate while
owning the corpus, if the grantor's wife were then dead and the grantor
had in the meantime made no other testamentary disposition. Although
the grantor had the consent of his wife and his only next of kin, the
72 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(I) at 14, Report of Law Rev. Com. 314 (1945) and cases cited
therein.
73 Willets v. Titus, 14 Hun 554 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 2d Dep't 1878); Matter of Levy,
238 App. Div. 489, 264 N.Y. Supp. 795 (1st Dep't 1933). See Roe v. Vingert, 117 N.Y.
204, 217, 22 N.E. 933, 936 (1889). Contra, Harris v. Clark, 7 N.Y. 242 (1852).
74 See Matter of Murphy, 213 App. Div. 319, 322, 210 N.Y. Supp. 531, 533-534 (2d Dep't
1925); Matter of Kirby, 133 Misc. 152, 154, 231 N.Y. Supp. 408, 412 (Surr. Ct. West-
chester County 1928).
75 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(I), Report of Law Rev. Com. 301-307 (1945).
76 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 79-132 (1951).
77 Under the common law, a trust could not be revoked by the settlor unless he had
reserved a power to revoke. See Leg. Doc. No. 65(D) at 13, Report of Law Rev. Com. 91
(1951).
78 280 N.Y. 43, 19 N.E.2d 673 (1939).
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court refused to allow the revocation on -the ground that the gift over
to the heirs was intended as a remainder, and consequently that the
class of persons "beneficially interested" could not be determined until
the death of the grantor. In short, the trust was irrevocable in view of
the maxim "nemo est kaeres viventis," or "no one is the heir of a living
person." Of course, if the gift over to the grantor's heirs had been
construed as a reservation of a reversionary interest, the revocation
would have been permitted.
Under the ancient doctrine of worthier title, property was presumed
to pass by descent rather than through purchase in order to preserve
the incidents of feudal tenure.79" An earlier tendency in the New York
law to find a reversion s° had been limited in later decisions purporting to
find "clear expression" of an intent to create a remainder.8 ' The rule
of construction, however, is a difficult one to apply, and both the major-
ity and dissenting opinions in Matter of Burchells urged clarifying
legislation.
The Commission did not attempt to solve the problem of worthier
titie generally, but confined itself to recommending the exclusion of the
"heirs" or "next of kin" or "distributees" of the settlor from the
class of persons "beneficially interested," but for purposes of revocation
only.88 Although the revision has been criticized as being too narrow in
scope,84 it should be noted that it preserves the policy favoring revoca-
tion without embracing the somewhat discredited doctrine of worthier
title and without adoption of the rather drastic remedy of making trusts
revocable unless irrevocability is expressly provided.85
On the recommendation of the Commission a bill was submitted to
the Legislature in 1950 to impose a time limitation on actions to impress
79 See Matter of Burchell, 299 N.Y. 351, 358, 87 N.E.2d 293, 296 (1949), discussing the
origin of the doctrine.
80 See Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
81 See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson, 298 N.Y. 135, 81 N.E.2d 54 (1948); Matter of
Burchell, supra note 79.
82 Matter of Burchell, 299 N.Y. 351, 360, 362, 87 N.E.2d 293, 297, 298 (1949).
83 Where the class of remaindermen is ascertained but subject to increase by admission of
after-born members, as a gift over to the "issue" or "children" of a named person, a revoca-
tion is permitted with the consent of living remaindermen, notwithstanding the possibility
of future members. Smith v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 500, 41 N.E.2d 72
(1942).
84 See, e.g., Comment, "Trusts--Revocation Under Section 23 of the N.Y. Personal Prop-
erty Law," 26 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 678, 684 (1951).
85 Such an amendment, which was adopted in California (Calif. Civ. Code § 2280 (1949)),
would be contrary to the policy favoring indestructibility of income beneficiary trusts.
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 15; N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 103-105.
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a trust on real property conveyed by a trustee in breach of trust.86 The
bill, which would have added a new section 43-a to the Civil Practice
Act, was disapproved by the Governor. Where the existence of a trust
of real property is expressed in the instrument creating the estate of
the trustee, as by such words as "to X, trustee," or "to X, as trustee,"'87
a conveyance by the trustee in breach of trust is void.8 Thus a prospec-
tive purchaser at his peril must ascertain the powers of such trustee, or
refuse to deal with property that has once been "trust" property. In
cases where, for various reasons, the terms of the trust are kept secret,89
there is an almost insuperable obstacle to the alienation of the trust
res. The Commission declined to recommend such solutions to this
problem as making the transfers voidable instead of void,90 or making
the words "as trustee" mere descriptio personae, not imparting notice. 1
What was recommended was a proposal to limit the time in which bene-
ficiaries could bring an action to impress a trust to twenty years from
the recording of the trustee's conveyance, with no provision for tolling.
Limited to the situation where the only indication of the trust on record
is the expression "as trustee" or the like, the proposal would provide
a reasonable time in which to discover the breach and take action, but
would at the same time correct the present situation where the title to
the property may remain unmarketable indefinitely." As indicated pre-
viously, however, this proposed solution was not followed.
D. Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities
One of the outstanding contributions made by the Commission to the
literature of trusts is the study and recommendation relating to the Rule
Against Perpetuities as applied to spendthrift trusts.9" This study is too
detailed and too well known to make it either feasible or necessary to
86 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 361-387 (1950).
87 Matter of Muratori, 183 Misc. 967, 52 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1944)..
88 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 105.
89 Secrecy is often insisted upon where the trust is part of a family settlement and its
terms would reveal intimate details of family history. See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M) at 24, Re-
port of Law Rev. Com. 384 (1950).
90 This might encourage breach of trust through the use of "straw men." See Leg. Doc.
N .65(M) at 26, Report of Law Rev. Com. 386 (1950).
91 Such an amendment would substantially diminish the protection of the beneficiary's
interest.
92 Different statutes of limitation presently apply to actions by the beneficiary, depend-
ing upon whether an action for ejectment or an equitable action to impress a trust is in-
volved, and the limitation may be extended by tolling provisions. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§§ 34, 43, 53, and 60.
93 Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 281-361 (1938).
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discuss it at length. At the heart of the problem in New York is the
statutory system developed by the Revisers of 1830 to permit indestruct-
ible, inalienable trusts for beneficiaries already-under some disability. 4
Virtually all private express trusts where the income from the res is ap-
plied for the use of or paid over to the beneficiary are required to be
indestructible spendthrift trusts,95 inalienable by beneficiary and trustee
alike. 6 As a consequence, practically every express income-beneficiary
trust, whether of real property or personal property, suspends the power
of alienation and is void unless its duration is measured by one or two
designated lives in being at the creation of the trust.9 The Commission
recognized that spendthrift trusts should be permitted, but not required;
that they should be regulated as to size (in terms of the beneficiaries'
requirements for education and support) and duration (lives of bene-
ficiaries in being at time of creation); and that contravention of these
limitations should not make the trust void, but merely ineffective as
to that portion of trust property or period of time in excess of such
limitations. 8 The Commission's recommendations, however, were not
accepted. They have, nevertheless, received much favorable comment. 9
The two-life rule is applied to measure the duration of income-bene-
ficiary trusts, not because there is any necessary connection between
the Rule Against Perpetuities (in the sense of remote vesting of future
interests) and trusts, but simply because trusts of the income-beneficiary
type by statute necessarily suspend the power of alienation, and no other
statutory regulation of their duration exists.' Under spendthrift trusts
where the entire income may be unnecessary for the education and sup-
port of the beneficiary, excessively large holdings of property may become
inalienable; and by measuring the duration of such trusts by any two
designated lives, the trust res may remain tied up for a period having no
relationship to the needs of the beneficiary. At the same time, a violation
of the rule limiting suspension of the power of alienation to two desig-
nated lives in being makes the trust entirely void, and many spendthrift
trusts are thus completely nullified because of a violation of this complex
94 Id. at 44, Report of Law Rev. Corn. 324 (1938). An indestructible trust was unknown
in English law.
95 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 96(3). Such trusts are commonly called income-beneficiary
trusts and constitute by far the most numerous class.
96 N.Y. Real Prop. Law 99 103, 105; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 15.
97 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 42; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 11.
98 Leg. Doc. No. 65(M) at 20, 25, Report of Law Rev. Com. 300, 305 (1938).
99 See, e.g., Munson, "Recent Changes in Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities," 38
Cornell L.Q. 543, 564, 568-569 (1953).
loo The rule against restraints on alienation does not apply to spendthrift trusts. See
Leg. Doc. No. 65(M) at 19, 77, Report of Law Rev. Com. 299, 357 (1938).
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rule. These considerations argue for a thorough revision of the New
York law on this point, and for another attempt by the Commission to
bring it about.
Attempts to "do something" about the New York Rule Against Per-
petuities have become an annual event in Albany.10 1 The Law Revision
Commission first turned its attention to the problem in 1936.102 The
Rule Against Perpetuities prohibits the suspension of the absolute power
of alienation for a period exceeding two lives in being at the creation of
the estate or interest.' 3 The rule is extremely complex. Uncertainty and
difficulty in its application have resulted in part from the efforts of the
courts to save dispositions of property by forced construction of limita-
tions,104 excision of illegal provisions'0 5 and other devices. After a care-
ful analysis of the New York rule, the consultants who made the 1936
study reported:
In the judgment, of those who made the foregoing study, the present law
of New York concerning perpetuities and related matters lacks clarity,
frustrates reasonable desires of citizens of the State and is more complex
than is reasonably necessary .... 106
Although the Coinmission then pointed out the need for a revision of
the statutes governing perpetuities, and included a tentative draft of a
proposed statute, it made no recommendation as to legislation at that
time, preferring further study and discussion of the problem by all in-
terested persons. The study of the Rule Against Perpetuities, however,
played an important role in the Commission's subsequent recommenda-
tions relating to spendthrift trusts.:" But as indicated above, these
recommendations were not followed, and John Chipman Gray's state-
ment is, therefore, still true:
In no civilized country is the making of a will so delicate an operation,
and so likely to fail of success, as in New York. 03
101 The most recent attempt at amendment (1955 Assembly Int. No. 454, Pr. No. 454)
passed the Assembly but died in the Senate judiciary Committee. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Cir.
No. 95 (May 9, 1955).
102 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 473-608 (1936).
103 Suspension of the power of alienation occurs through the creation of future interests
in unascertained persons, by creation or exercise of a power over property and by creation
of income-beneficiary trusts. See Leg. Doc. No. 65(H) at 59-73, Report of Law Rev. Com.
531-545 (1936).
104 See Kahn v. Tierney, 135 App. Div. 897, 120 N.Y. Supp. 663 (2d Dep't 1909) as an
illustration.
105 See, e.g., Matter of Norner, 237 N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924).
106 Leg. Doc. No. 65(H) at 135, Report of Law Rev. Com. 607 (1936).
107 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 281-361 (1938).
108 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities § 750 .(1915 ed.).
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The Law Revision Commission, then, failed in its objective of a new
statutory pattern. But by its studies and recommendations, which are
recognized as the authoritative literature on this subject, the Commis-,
sion has put in its lasting debt countless New York 'lawyers who must
still practice under the present system, and to these must be added
hundreds of law students throughout the state who each year must still
study and be examined upon itl
IV. MISCELLA ous
This final classification is labelled "Miscellaneous" for lack of any
particular common thread running through the many and diverse real
property problems that have received the Law Revision Commission's
attention these past twenty years.
A few illustrative topics, selected at random, will serve to indicate
the considerable range of the Commission's interests.
In 1942 section 539 of the Real Property Law was enacted upon the
Commission's recommendation: 0 9
§ 539. Action for the removal of encroaching structures
1. An action may be maintained by the owner of any legal estate in
land for an injunction directing the removal of a structure encroaching on
such land. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as limiting the
power of the court in such an action to award damages in an appropriate
case in lieu of an injunction or to render such other judgment as the facts
may justify.
2. This section shall not be deemed to repeal or modify any existing
statute or local law relating to encroaching structures. Added L. 1942,
c. 321, eff. April 3, 1942.
Section 539 was largely an outgrowth of City of Syracuse v. Hogan,"0
in which the Court of Appeals held that an action for a mandatory in-
junction to compel the removal of an encroaching structure was es-
sentially an action in ejectment to recover the possession of real prop-
erty, and as such there was a right to trial by jury. The majority opinion
suggested that an ejectment action would satisfactorily protect the
plaintiff's interest since the judgment could include damages for with-
holding the property as well as expenses of removing the encroachment;
further, if the judgment could not be enforced by execution ("The sheriff
might not regard it as his duty to deliver possession by taking down
the wall, which would burden him with the risk of injury to other por-
tions of defendant's building, not included within the nine inches"'),
109 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 69-94 (1936).
110 234 N.Y. 457, 138 N.E. 406 (1923).
Ill Baron v. Korn, 127 N.Y. 224, 228, 27 N.E. 804, 805 (1891).
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then the defendant could be punished for contempt. The following year
the Appellate Division in Johnson v. Purpura"2 construed the Hogan
decision as precluding injunctive relief in an encroachment case.
As between the innocent land owner and the wrongful encroacher, it
seemed clear that the risk and cost of removing the encroachment should
be borne by the latter. To accomplish this result, section 539 was en-
acted to make the equitable remedy of injunction available in such a
case.
To this writer's mind, one quite telling question has been raised with
respect to the effect of section 539, and it relates to the matter of a
jury trial where title to real property is involved. Is there a right to
trial by jury under section 539? The section itself gives no clear answer.
The Civil Practice Act provides for a jury trial in an ejectment action
unless waived;" 3 and a waiver results from "moving the trial of the
action, without a jury, or, if the adverse party so moves it, by failing
to claim a trial by a jury, before the production of any evidence upon
the trial.""' 4 The New York Constitution, in addition, now includes
a guarantee of trial by jury, unless waived, in "all cases in which it has
heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision;" until changed
in 1938 to the present provision, the guarantee of jury trial covered "all
cases in which it has been heretofore used."" 5
Is a jury trial under section 539 required by Practice Act or Con-
stitution? The study in support of the Commission's recommendation of
the new section concluded that "the Court of Appeals has repeatedly
affirmed judgments which granted injunctive relief directing the removal
of an encroachment in equity suits where all issues of fact, including
that of title, were determined by the court without a jury.""' 6 On the
other hand, a thoughtful appraisal of the new legislation made shortly
after its enactment suggested the real possibility of an opposite answer
to the basic question:
Assuming that there is a constitutional right to a jury trial in cases
under the new law-and whether there is depends, in the final analysis,
upon whether the Court of Appeals examines what courts of equity did
over a century and a half ago, or what some modem writers suggest courts
of equity might then have done-what has been accomplished by the recent
enactment? . . .The total effect of the new statute is to make available
to the owner of any legal estate in land equitable relief, in the form of a
112 208 App. Div. 505, 203 N.Y. Supp. 581 (3d Dep't 1924).
13 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 425.
"14 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 426(4).
"15 N.Y. Const., Art. I, § 2.
136 Leg. Doc. No. 65(C) at 23, Report of Law Rev. Com. 83 (1942).
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mandatory injunction or in lieu thereof damages, as an alternative to eject-
ment regardless of the adequacy of that or any other legal remedy.
It is submitted that, aside from making this relief available to the
owner of a future estate, the same result accomplished by the recent enact-
ment might better have been achieved by amending Section 405 of the
Civil Practice Act to authorize contempt proceedings where it is not
practicable to enforce by execution a judgment for the plaintiff in an action
of ejectment. Such an amendment would have made the statute read as
the Court of Appeals in City of Syracuse v. Hogan thought it read; it
would have avoided any question of jury trial since its effect would have
been limited to the enforcement of a judgment after a trial in ejectment,
in which both Constitution and statute clearly require a trial by jury.117
There have been two reported cases under section 539."' It is in-
teresting to note that in one of them, Schoenfeld v. Chapman,"9 the
court determined the question of title without a jury. The significance
of this case on the question of the defendant's right to trial by jury is
not clear, however, because of the lack of evidence on whether the de-
fendant in fact asked for a jury trial. The basic question, then, of the
right to trial by jury under section 539 still awaits a definitive answer.
Early in its history the Commission undertook a study of problems
related to the risk of loss in executory contracts for the sale of real
property. The result was the enactment in 1936 of new section 240-a
of the Real Property Law, known as the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser
Risk Act.2 Under New York law at that time, the risk of loss shifted
to the vendee when the contract was made, and yet the vendee was denied
recourse to the vendor's existing fire insurance policies. The situation
was one of possible substantial injustice to a vendee whose contract did
not expressly cover the contingency of destruction or damage to the
premises at any time after the contract had been entered into. Section
240-a changes the rule which placed the risk of loss upon the purchaser
at the time of making the contract. It delays the shifting of such risk
of loss to the vendee until there has been a transfer of title or of posses-
sion to him, either of which events should alert the purchaser to the
necessity of arranging for his own insurance coverage.
Section 121-b of the Insurance Law (now, in substance, section 170)
was recommended and enacted in 1936 as a companion bill to section
117 Note, 28 Cornell L.Q. 110, 116-117 (1942).
118 Schoenfeld v. Chapman, 200 Misc. 444, 102 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1950), modified, 280 App. Div. 464, 115 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dep't 1952), appeal dismissed, 305
N.Y. 698, 112 N.E.2d 779 (1953); and Natale v. Mazzuki, 198 Misc. 494, 98 N.Y.S.2d 692
(Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1950), modified, 278 App. Div. 591, 102 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d
Dep't 1951).
119 See note 118 supra.
120 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 755-780 (1936).
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240-a of the Real Property Law. The New York standard fire insurance
policy at that time included a provision that the policy should be void
"if any change, other than by the death of an insured, take place in the
interest, title or possession of the subject of insurance (except change
of occupants, without increase of hazard)" without the consent of the
insurer.12' There was authority in this state indicating that a contract
of sale, even without a transfer of possession to the vendee, might in-
validate the vendor's insurance under such a "change of interest" pro-
vision. 2 In view of the fact, therefore, that section 240-a would post-
pone the shift of risk of loss to the vendee beyond the time of making
the contract, it became increasingly important to protect the vendor
against the impairment of his insurance rights. Section 121-b (now, in
substance, section 170) was designed to afford that protection.
Section 170 now provides:
The making of a contract to sell or to exchange real property shall not
constitute a change in the interest, title or possession, within the meaning
of the applicable provisions of any contract of fire insurance, including
any contract supplemental thereto, hereafter made covering property
located in this state.
It is interesting to note that while section 121-b (170) of the In-
surance Law was enacted in 1936 because of the "change of interest"
provision of the then New York standard fire insurance policy, this same
provision was omitted from the standard fire policy adopted in 1943 and
presently in use. 23 Quaere, as to whether section 170 should be retained
as serving any useful purpose.
At common law the action of ejectment was the only method available
to recover the possession of real property." So lengthy and expensive
was this action, that a summary proceeding to dispossess was developed
to eliminate some of the delay and cost. The New York statutes which
provide this remedy,2 5 being in derogation of the common law, are
strictly construed. Upon the Commission's recommendation, sections
1411 and 1414 of the Civil Practice Act were amended in 1951 in order
to fill in a gap in the availability of these summary proceedings.2 6
Under section 1410 of the Practice Act summary proceedings are
121 See lines 20 et seq. of New York standard fire insurance policy in effect under pro-
visions of Laws 1917, c. 440, § 3. See also Laws 1939, c. 882, § 168.
122 See Germond v. Home Insurance Co., 2 Hun 540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 3d Dep't
1874); Sewell v. Underhill, 127 App. Div. 92, 111 N.Y. Supp. 85 (2d Dep't 1908), aff'd,
197 N.Y. 168, 90 N.E. 430 (1910). But see Tiemann v. Citizens' Insurance Co., 76 App. Div.
5, 78 N.Y. Supp. 620 (1st Dep't 1902).
123 N.Y. Insurance Law § 168.
124 The New York equivalent is contained in Art. 63 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 990 et seq.
125 Art. 83, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1410 et seq.
126 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 43-78 (1951).
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available in cases where a landlord-tenant relationship exists. Section
1411 expands the remedy to cover certain situations where that relation-
ship is lacking. Prior to 1951, however, the only provision for removal
of a "squatter" was limited to the case where both the entry and the
possession of the "squatter" were unlawful." Thus, where there was
no landlord-tenant relationship, and where the entry was with the per-
mission of the person entitled to possession, an action of ejectment was
necessary to recover possession of the premises. For example, a guest
(i.e., licensee) who refused to vacate his host's apartment on demand
could not be dispossessed summarily. 128 Nor could the lessee of a de-
ceased life tenant be summarily removed. 29
The Court of Appeals, in Williams v. Alt,130 said:
The court has no power or authority to sustain a proceeding not within
the statutory provisions. It is a case where the legislature might with
good reason add another subdivision to said section 2232 [now § 1411]
to include a case where persons like the respondents who come rightfully
into the possession of real property remain therein without right after
the death of a life tenant and the termination of their rightful possession
thereof.'13
The Commission's amendments have operated to make these sum-
mary proceedings available to reversioners and remaindermen against
the lessees of deceased life tenants, and to persons entitled to possession
against licensees who remain in possession without permission.
Another problem considered by the Commission is the recovery of
damages for injury by a third person to land divided into possessory and
future interests. By statute, the owner of a vested remainder or rever-
sion has a right of action in such a case.' 32 The Court of Appeals held,
however, that his action might be barred by a recovery of the total
damages by the owner of the possessory estate, the court then having
an obligation to protect the interest of the remainderman or reversioner
in such a recovery.13 3 To make certain the enforcement of the wrong-
doer's full liability without prejudice to the rights of the owner of a
future interest, and, at the same time, to protect the wrongdoer from a
multiplicity of actions, a new section 538 of the Real Property Law was
passed in 1935 upon the Commission's recommendation, providing that
the owner of a possessory estate for life or for years may recover full fee
127 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1411(4).
128 Rosenzweig v. Portnoy, 117 Misc. 136, 191 N.Y. Supp. 900 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1921).
129 Williams v. Alt, 226 N.Y. 283, 123 N.E. 499 (1919).
130 See note 129 supra.
131 226 N.Y. 283, 291, 123 N.E. 499, 501 (1919).
132 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 531.
133 Rogers v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 213 N.Y. 246, 107 N.E. 661 (1915).
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damages only if all living persons having possessory or future interests
are also joined as parties.'34 In 1947 the Commission successfully spon-
sored an amendment to section 538 to provide certain rules to govern the
allocation of the recovery among the parties entitled to it.135
The list of additional topics which have been the subject matter of
the Commission's studies and recommendations is an impressive one.
It includes warranties in conveyances made without consideration; 136
jurisdiction of the court in a separation action to give directions with
respect to the occupancy of real property held by the parties as tenants
by the entirety;137 adverse possession by tenants in common; 3 ' acts
which constitute waste; 139 recovery of treble damages for injuries to
property and for waste by guardian; 140 judicially authorized mortgages,
leases and sales of real property; 141 application to deeds of the doctrine
of implication of cross remainder; 42 disability of alien enemies with
respect to real property; 143extinguishment of inchoate right of dower; ' 4
conveyance of land out of possession; 145 scope of the term "public im-
provement" in the Lien Law;' 46 holding over after the expiration of a
tenancy;147 termination of tenancies; 48 security for damages caused
134 See Leg. Doc. No. 60(G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 345-448 (1935).
135 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 289-437 (1947). Section 538
of the N.Y. Real Prop. Law was amended to refer specifically to N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 1053-a, which provides the distribution method in a partition action (i.e., the court elects
whether compensation shall be by a sum in gross or by the income from the proceeds in-
vested for the duration of the interest which has been injured unless all interested persons
agree on the form of settlement). The pertinent provisions on the valuation of the interests
in real property are contained in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, Art. 80-a, §§ 1330-1335, added by
Laws 1947, c. 848 on the recommendation of the Commission. See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 289-437 (1947).
136 Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 65-70 (1944); Leg. Doc. No. 65(K)
Report of Law Rev. Com. 483-516 (1943).
137 Leg. Doc. No. 65(L) (1953).
188 Leg. Doc. No. 65(j), Report of Law Rev. Com. 707-729 (1949).
139 Leg. Doc. No. 65(D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 41-46 (1937); Leg. Doc. No. 65(F),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 4S5-460 (1936); Leg. Doc. No. 60(G), Report of Law Rev.
Com. 345-448 (1935).
140 Leg. Doc. No. 65(J), Report of Law Rev. Com. 291-347 (1944).
141 Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 47-60 (1937); Leg. Doc. No. 65(G),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 461-472 (1936); Leg. Doc. No. 60(G), Report of Law Rev. Com.
345-448 (1935).
142 Leg. Doe. No. 65(C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 35-40 (1937); Leg. Doc. No. 65(B),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 59-64 (1936); Leg. Doc. No. 60(G), Report of Law Rev. Com.
345-448 (1935).
143 Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 451-488 (1944).
144 Leg. Doc. No. 65(L), Report of Law Rev. Com. 229-280 (1938).
145 Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 141-188 (1941).
146 Leg. Doc. No. 65(N), Report of Law Rev. Com. 489-525 (1944).
147 Leg. Doc. No. 65(P), Report of Law Rev. Com. 405421 (1938).
148 Leg. Doc. No. 65(0), Report of Law Rev. Com. 371-403 (1938).
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by the filing of a lis pendens; 149 limitation of the duration of restrictions
voluntarily imposed on the use of land;' 50 the Statute of Frauds apply-
ing to executory agreements; 151 attornment by a tenant of mortgaged
property upon foreclosure of the mortgage; 52 installment land con-
tracts;153 the vendee's lien on land to secure restitution or damages;' 54
and the procedure followed in discharging an ancient mortgage.155
CONCLUSION
As would be expected, some of the Commission's projects have been
of more importance than others. A great majority of its recommenda-
tions in the real property field have resulted in the enactment of new
legislation. Some proposals, on the other hand, have not-at least as yet
-found their way to the statute books. But these latter have not been
without significance, for the studies have enriched legal literature, and
it is important to point the way to improvement and reform even though
acceptance may come only later on if at all.
Writing in 1937 on A Ministry of Justice in Action, the late Justice
Bernard L. Shientag surveyed the first two years of the Commission's life:
The Commission is to be congratulated on-the constructive achievements
accomplished in the first two years of its existence. It is a happy augury
of what may be expected in the future.155
Justice Shientag was prophet as well as judge, for fourteen years later,
in his 1951 Hughes Memorial Lecture on The Stream of Progress in the
Law, he brought down to date his appraisal of the Commission's work
in these words:
The work of the Law Revision Commission has been especially valuable
.... its recommendations supported by thorough, expert research studies,
have brought about important reforms in the law, too numerous even for
mention here. In the neighborhood of one hundred and fifty laws of vary-
ing degrees of importance have been enacted as the result of its recom-
mendations. 157
Today, in 1955, this writer joins his associates in this symposium in
a salute to the New York Law Revision Commission on twenty years of
distinguished service!
149 Leg. Doc. No. 65(F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 203-226 (1951).
250 Leg. Doc. No. 65(P), Report of Law Rev. Com. 689-780 (1951). See also, Farnham,
"Building Restrictions-Is Legislation Necessary?" 23 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Bulletin 411
(1951).
'51 Leg. Doc. No. 65(D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 71-102 (1944).
152 Leg. Doc. No. 65(H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 189-207 (1941).
153 Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 47-55 (1938); Leg. Doc. No. 65(M),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 343-386 (1937).
154 Leg. Doc. No. 65(K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 249-270 (1947).
155 Leg. Doc. No. 65(0), Report of Law Rev. Com. 601-605 (1948).
156 Shientag, "A Ministry of Justice in Action," 22 Cornell L.Q. 183, 194 (1937).
157 Shientag, "Stream of Progress in the Law," 21 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 40 (1952).
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